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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the laws on business organizations in China is closely
related with continuing economic reform. From 1949 to 1978, the Chinese economic
system was based on a planned model. That system was very rigid. Within such an
economy, the means of production (productive resources) were owned mostly by the
state, leaving a minor portion in the hands of enterprises (normally in one form of a
collective ownership). The decision-making power for macroeconomic activities and
for business activities of enterprises was concentrated in the hands of the state. While
* An earlier version of this Article first appeared in INTRODUCTIONTO CHINESE LAW (SWEET & MAxWELL
ASIA, HONG KONG, 1997). However, this Article has substantially changed the content of the earlier version and
is a much expanded version.
** Assistant Professor at Law, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong. I thank Rosamund
Lockwood, the Associate Articles Editor of The Transnational Lawyer, for her comments and editing.
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the market still existed, since currency-commodity relations i remained, various
targets were realized through mandatory plans drawn up by the state hierarchy. The
enterprises immediately responsible for production had to follow state orders in busi-
ness activities, including finance, management, marketing, employment, wage policy
and expansion, and enjoyed hardly any independence. As the economic benefits of
enterprises were not linked with their performance, enterprises with significant
profits had no right to dispose of their profits while enterprises operating with heavy
losses were subsidized by the state. Economic information was transmitted vertically 2
between the higher and lower levels in the administrative system in the form of
instructions and reports. Within this system, there was no role for the law of business
organizations as known in Western countries. Insolvency was beyond any possible
imagination.
The advantage of this state run model was the employment of administrative
power through highly centralized planning to facilitate extensive concentration of
man power, material and financial resources in sectors and areas to which the state
had decided to give priority and where a high rate of capital accumulation was pos-
sible. But this highly centralized form of planned economy had its inherent flaws and
drawbacks.
First, economic planning through administrative methods was substituted for
enterprise management. Given the fact that freedom of contract and disposition of
certain types of property, especially land and real estate, were not recognized,
efficient voluntary cooperation between enterprises was impossible, resulting in the
misallocation of resources. Second, the level of government empowered to make
plans and policies for enterprises' production targets was too far removed from the
enterprises and consumers to secure the necessary information in time to make such
decisions. The amount of work required to plan and guide enterprises was beyond
any competent government, however benevolent and reliable. Because of the time
lag between changes in demand and changes in planning, there occurred tremendous
social deadweight losses as some products were in excessive supply while products
in great demand were always in short supply. As a result, ration coupons had to be
used to prevent chaos. The production of unwanted products was normal. The
information problems inherent in central planning were criticized?
One major criticism is that the knowledge necessary for constructing a rational
economic order never exists in a concentrated or integrated form, but is available
exclusively as dispersed and frequently contradictory fragments in the minds of the
multitude of separate purchasers and suppliers. Knowledge of this kind, by its very
1. Although production of most goods or services was planned by the State, these goods or services were
not directly allocated to individuals. Instead, these goods or services were exchanged through the medium of money
on the market.
2. Rigid economic planning was a norm during the early period of socialist countries. This to a large extent
suppressed the price mechanism.
3. See generally Frank Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Sociely, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)
(describing rational economic order in relation to economic problems and solutions).
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nature, cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central
authority in statistical form. The price mechanism determined by market forces of
supply and demand, in contrast, effectively coordinates the separate actions of
different purchaser and suppliers in an economy in which knowledge is widely
dispersed. Indeed, the real function of the price system is that of a mechanism for
communicating information which otherwise could not be communicated.
Third, there were major defects in the systems of incentives. As appendages of
state organs, the enterprises were subject only to compulsory administrative
instructions. For them, there was neither the internal motive force of wealth maximi-
zation nor the external pressure of competition. Since economic benefits were not
linked to their performance, the enterprises generally overstated their input require-
ments such as manpower, raw materials and electricity and understated the capacity
of their outputs of goods and services. Hence this model eventually resulted in low
economic efficiency. Finally, as employees were supposed to be working for the
public good and not for personal interests, remuneration was not related to good per-
formance. As a result, egalitarianism was prevalent among employees of enterprises:
the employees of state-owned enterprises were assured of their "iron rice bowls"
(their jobs), and they could "eat from the same big pot"(i.e., public assets in the state-
owned enterprises).
China's economic reform began in rural areas where the contractual respon-
sibility system was adopted. That system increased the role of the market as more
agricultural products were circulated on the market. In 1978, urban enterprises began
to be given more autonomy in managing their own affairs. They were allowed to
retain part of their profits. In 1984, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
adopted the Decisions on Reforming the Economic System.4 These Decisions
initiated reform of the enterprises in urban areas. The concept of separation between
ownership and management was recognized. The General Principles of the Civil
Law' (Civil Law) provides the basic framework of business operation by facilitating
the establishment of various forms of organizations such as individual business,
leaseholding farm households,6 individual partnerships, 7 legal persons, 8and eco-
nomic associations.9
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy has significantly
increased the role of law in business. Considering the increasing need of laws and
regulations, the State Council adopted the Provisional Regulations on Administration
of the Individual Industrial and Commercial Households in Urban and Rural Areas
4. Decisions on Reforming the Economic System, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 899 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1984) [hereinafter Laws and Regulations].
5. See The General Principles of the Civil Law, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPBLIC OF
CHINA (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1986).
6. Id. arts. 26-27.
7. Id. arts. 30-35.
8. Id. arts. 36-50.
9. Id. arts. 51-53.
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(AIICH) in 1987.10 While the AICH only permits the individual owner to hire not
more than seven people, the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises (Private
Enterprise Regulations)" promulgated by the State Council a year later allows the
individual investor and owner to employ more than eight people. Thus, an artificial
distinction, based on the number of employees, has been created by these different
regulations for sole proprietorships.
On April 13, 1988, The Seventh National People's Congress adopted the Law
on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (IEOWP). 12 This law specifies
the nature, rights and duties of state-owned enterprises. According to this law, an
industrial enterprise owned by the whole people (state-owned enterprise) shall be a
socialist commodity production and operation unit. While the property of the
enterprise shall be owned by the whole people, the state-owned enterprise enjoys the
rights to possess, utilize and dispose of the property which the state has authorized
it to operate and manage. Consequently, the State confers upon the enterprise civil
rights with corresponding civil liability for the property. Quickly following this Law,
the State Council promulgated the Regulations on Rural Collectively-owned Enter-
prises in 1990 and the Regulations on Urban Collectively-owned Enterprises in
1991.13
In the 1990's, a consensus was reached among economics and legal scholars as
well as some governmental officials that reform of the enterprise system must move
towards a market oriented economy. In early 1992, Deng Xiao Ping visited Southern
China to promote further economic reform and to advocate the establishment of a
market economy in China. The Regulations for Converting the Status of the Enter-
prises Owned by the Whole People adopted by the State Council in 1992 were
intended to push the state-owned enterprises onto the market.
Meanwhile, some state-owned enterprises started to adopt the form of com-
panies. 4 That practice was based on both the Opinions on the Standardization of
10. Provisional Regulations on Administration of the Individual Industrial and Commercial Households in
Urban and Rural Areas, reprinted in THE LAws OF THE PEOPLE'S REPU3LIC OF CHINA 515 (The Legal Affairs
Bureau of the State Counsil) (1987) [hereinafter ARCH].
11. The Private Enterprise Regulations, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 911
(The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1988).
12. The Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, adopted at the 1st Sess. of the 7th
National People's Congress and promulgated by Order No. 3 of the President of the People's Republic of China
(Apr. 13, 1988).
13. Regulations on Rural Collectively-owned Enterprises, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1990); Regulations on Urban Collectively-
owned Enterprises, reprinted in THE LAWS OFTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (The Legal'Affairs Bureau of the
State Counsil) (1990-91).
14. There are two types of companies in China. One is limited liability companies, the other is joint stock
companies. Where a company is a limited liability company, each shareholder shall assume liability towards the
company to the extent of the amount of capital contributed by him, and the company shall be liable for its debts
to the extent of all its assets.
Where a company is a joint stock company, its total capital shall be divided into equal shares; each share-
holder shall assume liability toward the company to the extent of the amount of shares held by him, and the
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Limited Liability Companies and the Opinions on the Standardization of Joint Stock
Companies issued by the State Economic Structure Reform Commission of the State
Council. As a result of these two Opinions it was generally recognized that com-
panies were an essential part of a modem enterprise system. Thus, the Company Law
was soon enacted at the end of 1993 and replaced the two Opinions mentioned
immediately above.
A special feature in the development of China's business organizations law is the
change of emphasis. In the past, the laws and regulations on business organizations
were organized in accordance with the nature of ownership. The laws on state-owned
enterprises and collectively-owned enterprises, to name only a few, followed this
line. It is expected that future development of the laws in this area will be organized
along the lines of the nature of the organization. It may be foreseen that a sole
proprietorship law will be enacted by the National People's Congress soon. A
Partnership Law was recently adopted by the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress in February 1997.
A major theme running throughout this article is that economic reform in China
is a crucial factor shaping the law of business organizations. After this brief intro-
duction, Section II examines the law of sole proprietorships. Although the law in this
area is still in a state of flux, the development of the law reveals two characteristics.
One is that the law develops from very brief and vague provisions in the Civil Law
to relatively detailed provisions in the AIICH. The other is that the law begins to
liberalize the private sector. Before the Private Enterprise Regulations, a sole
proprietor could not employ more than seven people. The Private Enterprise Regu-
lations not only allow the sole proprietor to employee more than eight people but also
widens the scope of trades and commercial activities for small private investors. In
addition, the Private Enterprise Regulations permit small private investors to
establish equity or contractual Chinese-foreign joint ventures with foreign investors.
When the law of sole proprietorships is discussed, policy issues are also considered
where appropriate. The expected Law of Sole Proprietorships will further improve
the law in this area.
Section III discusses the law of partnerships. The law in this area has also
developed very rapidly. In 1986, there existed only a few provisions in the Civil Law
on individual partnerships and enterprise partnerships. Individual partnerships are
now mainly adopted by law firms, accounting firms, consulting firms, and other
small businesses. These individual partnerships have contributed considerably to a
market oriented economy. Enterprise partnerships were closely related with eco-
nomic cooperation between various industries and regions in the 1980s. Some of
these enterprise partnerships were harbingers of friendly mergers and acquisitions.
These mergers and acquisitions have facilitated efficient resource allocation. The
brief provisions, however, have given rise to many application problems in the
company shall be liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets.
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courts. To deal with that problem, the Supreme People's Court issued in 1988 some
Opinions to the lower courts, instructing them how to apply the law of partnerships.
The newly enacted Partnership Law provides relatively detailed provisions,
facilitating people to organize partnerships in China. Similar to partnership laws in
the West, the Partnership Law provides the parties in a partnership a large scope of
contractual freedom in specifying their rights and duties in a partnership agreement.
The relationship between the Partnership Law and the Civil Law is viewed in China
as a relationship between special law and general law. As a special law compared
with the Civil Law, the Partnership Law prevails over the Civil Law whenever there
is a conflict between the two laws, or whenever there are relevant provisions
covering an issue in the Partnership Law. However, the Civil Law applies when there
are no relevant provisions related to a specific issue in the Partnership Law.
Section IV examines the Company Law, focusing mainly on the formation of
companies and their governance structure although other aspects such as mergers and
dissolutions are also canvassed. This Company Law plays a significant role in
China's transition period toward a market oriented economy. On their surface, the
provisions related to limited liability companies and joint stock companies are
relatively good. The minimum registered capital requirement for a joint stock
company (Rmb 10 million) and a listed company (Rmb 50 million), however, appear
to be very high. There may be two bad consequences. One is the reduction of com-
petition in certain industries as smaller companies are not able to enter into such
industries. The other is the obstacle for small private or collectively-owned enter-
prises to raise capital on the market. These small enterprises are the victims of credit
squeeze as the bank loans are mainly directed to large inefficient state-owned
enterprises. The minimum registered capital requirement (Rmb 100,000-500,000) for
small limited companies, on the other hand, can be justified at this stage in China as
there exists a wide scale of fraud against creditors by the controlling investors of
these small companies. The possibility of transferring risks to creditors by the
controlling investors in these companies is high. Moreover, some of these companies
may be one shot players on the market instead of repeating players. As such, the
market discipline does not seem to be effective against these small companies. There-
fore, the provision of minimum registered capital requirement for limited liability
companies need strict enforcement.
The provisions on governance structure can be applied to private companies
without much difficulty. To state-owned companies, however, these provisions are
not quite relevant. No matter how elegant the provisions regarding shareholders'
powers are, they cannot be applied to state-owned enterprises as there exist no real
shareholders, in practice, in these companies. Once monitoring by shareholders on
directors, supervisors, and senior managers is not possible or ineffective, there is no
assurance that these directors, supervisors, or senior managers will work for the best
interest for the State-owned companies. The serious corruption problem in these
companies is an indication as to how their directors, supervisors, and senior
managers are abusing their powers. If the Company Law is not able to play an
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important role in corporate governance in China's state-owned companies, market
disciplines are indispensable. However, market disciplines are not very effective yet.
This seems to be a common problem in the former socialist countries. While the old
controlling mechanisms are gone, new controlling devices are still not available yet.
The last Section focuses on the law of state-owned enterprises, which have not
been transformed to state-owned companies yet, and the law of collectively-owned
enterprises. These two types of enterprises dominated the Chinese economy before
1978. At present, their relative importance has considerably decreased given the fact
that the private sector has rapidly developed with the involvement of foreign
investment and investment of domestic individuals. The provisions related to the
collectively-owned enterprises are briefly examined. While other provisions are also
treated, the major focus of the discussion is on governance provisions. With respect
to State-owned enterprises, politics still vexes the development and enforcement of
the law. The reasons why it is difficult to enforce the Bankruptcy Law are briefly
explained. China is in a critical stage in its history. Although it has eliminated the
planned economy model, China still has to confront the ideological issue of whether
the large number of inefficient State-owned enterprises should be maintained.
Furthermore, it has to deal with the problem of serious unemployment in State-
owned enterprises. The next decade is a very important period to test whether eco-
nomic reform will be complete and successful.
II. SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS
Sole proprietorship is a form of business in which one person owns all the assets
of the business in contrast to a partnership or a corporation. The sole proprietor is
solely liable for all the debts of the business.' s Currently, a sole proprietorship in
China may take the name of individual industrial and commercial households or of
private enterprises where the sole proprietor employs more than eight employees,
16
or of individual business.
The Constitution of China provides the legal basis for people to establish and
operate the business by adopting the form of sole proprietorships. The state permits
the existence and development of private economy17 and individual economy'8 within
the limits prescribed by law. Private and individual economy is a complement to the
public socialist economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the
15. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note 11, art. 7. Private enterprises include sole proprietorships,
partnerships and companies so long as the investment is not from the State.
16. Id. art. 2.
17. Private economy refers to private investment in contrast to State investment. It differs from individual
economy in that the investors may also adopt the organization of partnerships or companies.
18. Individual economy refers to a business in the form of sole proprietorship where the sole proprietor
employs no more than seven persons.
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private and individual economy and guides, assists, and supervises the private and
individual economy.19
Currently, three major pieces of legislation are applicable to sole proprietorships.
The Civil Law, the first piece of legislation, provides some general provisions. 0
Second, the Provisional Regulations for the Administration of Individual Industrial
and Commercial Households in Urban and Rural Areas (AIICH) 21 regulate sole pro-
prietorships which employs one or two helpers and/or three to five apprentices.
Pursuant to the AIICH, the maximum number of staff the investor may have is seven.
Third, the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprise Regulations' apply to those
with more than eight employees. The distinction of assigning different names to
seemingly the same type of business organizations is undoubtedly unsound. It
indicates the chaotic state of the law and lack of rationality in drafting laws and regu-
lations. Zhao has also criticized this distinction and predicted that these regulations
will soon be replaced by a sole-proprietorship law.'
These regulations indicate that the sole proprietorship is not a separate legal
entity. The Civil Law stipulates that "individual business" refers to a business run by
individual citizens who have been lawfully registered and approved to engage in
industrial or commercial operation within the sphere permitted by law.24 The debts
of an individual business shall be covered by the individual's property if the business
is operated by an individual and by the family's property if the business is operated
by the family.2 The AIICH provides that individual industrial and commercial
household business may be run by an individual or by his or her family. If the
business is run by an individual, that person is liable for the debts of the business by
his or her personal assets. If the business is, however, run by a family, the debts are
secured by the assets of the family.26 Similarly, the Private Enterprise Regulations
state that the investor of the sole proprietorship has unlimited liability for the debts
of the business.27 Pursuant to these regulations, the assets of the other non-investing
spouse will be vulnerable if the business is run by the family. The justification for
this position seems to be based on the equitable belief that if the other spouse
receives benefits by participating in the business, he or she shall also be held to bear
the burden. An alternative interpretation of why the other spouse's assets becomes
involved is that the business is viewed as a quasi-partnership.
19. XIANFA, art. 11 (People's Republic of China), reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 6 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1982). Article 11 was amended in 1988. See XIANFA,
art. 11 (People's Republic of China), reprinted in THE LAWS OFiTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 32 (The Legal
Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1988) (amending the Constitution of the People's Republic of China).
20. Civil Law, supra note 5, arts. 26-29.
21. AUCH, supra note 10.
22. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note 11.
23. Zhao Xu-dong, A Study of Sole Proprietorship Legislation, 1 F. LAW & POL 65, 68 (1995).
24. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 26.
25. Id. art. 29.
26. AICH, supra note 10, art. 4.
27. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note 11, art. 7.
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The AICH only lists three categories of people who may apply to engage in
individual industrial and commercial household business. They include persons
waiting for jobs in urban areas, farmers in rural areas, and others permitted by the
policy of the state.28 The last category seems to be quite vague. The Implementation
Measures of the Private Enterprise Regulations (IMPER) provide explanation of
some very similar categories contained in the Private Enterprise Regulations. 9
According to these Measures, persons permitted by laws, regulations and policies
mainly include: (i) retired scientific and technical persons;, 0 (ii) scientific and tech-
nical persons who are still employed but without receiving remuneration from their
institutions; 1 (iii) retired persons from enterprises and institutions, 2 and (iv)
specified retired people33 from party and governmental bodies.
The AICH provides a non-exhaustive list of sectors, or trades, where private
business is permitted. They include industry, handicraft, construction, transportation,
commerce, food and beverage, services, repair, and other trades.34 Detailed ex-
planations of these sectors, or trades, are given by the Implementation Rules of the
AIICH.3 ' The Private Enterprise Regulations add a category of consultancy3 6 The
Implementation Measures of the Private Enterprise Regulations further expand the
scope to include trades or services related to culture, arts, travel, sports, food pro-
duction, medicine and medical services, fishing and other trades. One special feature
of legislation in China is that implementation rules may add things which are not
mentioned in the main legislation. They are not only restricted to the role of
clarifying provisions in the main legislation. Delegation by the high regulatory body
in the main legislation does not delimit the powers of the lower regulatory body on
implementation rules. While the AICH does not specify any prohibited area of
business, the Private Enterprise Regulations state that private enterprises are pro-
hibited from engaging in business in the military or financial industry or from pro-
ducing prohibited products. 7
Whether engaging in business as a private enterprise or as an individual
industrial and commercial household, a business licence has to be obtained from the
local State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC). To operate an
28. AUCH, supra note 10, art. 2.
29. THE IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES OF THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE REGULATIONS ART. 3 (State
Administration of Industry and Commerce) (1989) [hereinafter IMPER].
30. There are two categories of people included in retired persons. One category (ii xiu ren yuan) refers to
those who have achieved certain levels or satisfied certain criteria and are entitled to better retirement benefits. The
other category (tui xiu ren yuan) include those who have reached their normal retirement age and are entitled to
normal retirement benefits.
31. IMPER, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. AICH, supra note 10, art. 3.
35. The Implementation Rules of AIICH, art. 5 (1987).
36. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note 11, art. 12.
37. Id.
1997/Emerging Framework of China's Business Organizations Law
individual business, the applicant has to submit the formal household registration.38
Sometimes, he or she has to submit documents approved by some competent
authorities. For instance, documents of approval of the public security bureau are
required for hotel operation or printing business. 39 For food and beverage business,
a certificate from a health and sanitary supervisory body is needed!0
Individual industrial and commercial household business is carried out at the
places where the sole proprietor has the household registration. If that person wants
to do business elsewhere, the original approval SAIC has to be notified. Further, the
SAIC of the intended place must approve the business and issue a temporary
business license.4' While the ARCH presupposes that the individual conducts his
business at the place where he has the household registration,42 the Private Enterprise
Regulations expressly provide that people may operate their business elsewhere if
they need to establish branch factories and stores.43 This surely facilitates economic
mobility. If the private enterprise, however, does intend to set up branches elsewhere,
business licenses from the SAICs of the intended place are required.
4
The applicant for individual business has to provide the local SAIC with the
following items: name of the applicant, name of the business, number of persons of
the household business including the sole proprietor, family members, helpers and
apprentices, registered capital, scope of business, and premises of the business.45 If
some of these items change during the course of business, modification of the former
registration is required.46 If the business ceases, the relevant SAIC has to be informed
and the business license returned.47 Similarly, if a division, merger, transfer of busi-
ness, or relocation of business of a private enterprise occurs, either modification of
the original registration or re-registration is required.48 If a private enterprise ceases
its business, cancellation of registration has to be done.49
Once a business license is received, the applicant of the sole proprietorship has
to go through tax registration with the local tax authorities.50 It is interesting to note
that the Private Enterprise Regulations mandate a growth fund for such an enter-
38. ARCH, supra note 10, art. 7.
39. Id.
40. Implementation Rules of the AIICH, supra note 35, art. 3.
41. Id. art 9.
42. Id. art. 2.
43. IMPER, supra note 29, art. 6.
44. Id. arts. 6. 10.
45. ARCH, supra note 10, art. 8.
46. Id. art. 9.
47. Id. art. 11.
48. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note 11, art. 16.
49. Id. art. 17.
50. Id. art. 34; AUCH, supra note 10, art. 20.
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prise.5t This fund should be no less than 50% of the after tax profits.52 The purpose
of this growth fund is for expansion, investment in other enterprises, repayment of
loans and interest, and offsetting any business losses. For any other uses, approval
from the tax authorities is required.53 The difficulty with this requirement is if the
costs of expansion are greater than the benefits, then why can't the sole proprietor
choose to use the profits himself?
One significant difference between the individual industrial and commercial
household business and private enterprises is the fact that the latter are able to set up
equity or contractual joint ventures with foreign investors. Further, private enter-
prises are permitted to engage in compensation trade, processing, assembling, and
manufacturing activities for foreign business entities.O
The SAICs at various levels are the major supervisory bodies of these individual
business and private enterprises. Basically, these bodies are responsible for regis-
tration, modification of registration, re-registration and cancellation of registration.
They have the power to check that registered individual business and private enter-
prises do not exceed the scope of their approved business activities. Sole proprietor-
ships are also subject to the supervision of other regulatory bodies. Tax authorities,
price control authorities and labour authorities are empowered to supervise these
business enterprises in their respective areas.
m. PARTNERSHIPS
The Civil Law has several provisions applicable to partnerships. As this law only
provides some basic insufficiently detailed principles, the Judicial Committee of the
Supreme People's Court promulgated on January 26, 1988 Certain Opinions on the
Implementation of the Civil Law (Opinions).55 Recently, China has enacted a
Partnership Law. 6 This Partnership Law is a major step forward in rationalizing the
law of business organizations. It provides considerable certainty and predictability
to business and organizational activities.
A partnership is defined as a profitable organization where partners agree to
contribute capital and collectively manage a business. The partners share profits and
51. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note II, art. 38.
52. Pursuant to article 38 of the Private Enterprise Regulations, approval of the tax authorities is required
if less than 50% of the after tax profit is allocated to this fund. Id.
53. Private Enterprise Regulations, supra note II, art. 38.
54. Id. art. 22.
55. For more information on interpretation of law by the Supreme People's Court, see generally Susan
Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145 (1993) (describing
the role played by the Supreme People's Court within the Chinese legal system and particularly the court's power
in interpreting laws in the courts). See generally Liu Nanping, An Ignored Source of Chinese Law: The Gazette of
the Supreme People's Court, I CONN. . INT'L L. 27 (1990) (detailing the role of the Supreme People's Court).
56. See LEGAL DALY, Feb. 24, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Partnership Law]. The Partnership Law was enacted
at the Twenty-fourth Session of the Eighth Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 23 February
1997 and became effective on 1 August 1997. Id.
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risks and bear unlimited liability for the debts of their partnerships. The Partnership
Law only permits unlimited partnerships.5 By negative implication, limited partner-
ships are not legally allowed. The Civil Law divides partnerships into two categories;
individual partnerships and enterprise partnerships. Individual partnerships refer to
two or more natural persons associated in a business and working together, with each
providing funds, materials, and techniques, according to a partnership agreement.58
Rights and duties between partners, methods of profit distribution, and liabilities for
the debts of the partnership among partners are spelled out in the partnership
agreement.59 The profits and losses are proportionally shared by the partners in the
agreement. Lacking such an agreement, the profits and losses are equally shared by
each partner. The operational decisions of an individual partnership shall be made
jointly by the partners, who each have the right to carry out these activities. Partners
may, however, delegate their powers to a responsible persont° or other persons
(managing partner or partners). The managing partner or partners have the power to
bind the partnership for his or their business decisions.1 In other words, all partners
shall bear civil liability for the operational activities of the managing partner or
partners.62 With respect to the debts of the partnership, each partner is jointly liable
toward creditors. However, after satisfying the claims of the creditors, a particular
partner may seek indemnity from other partners for the amount exceeding his or her
proportion as specified in the partnership agreement. 63 In other words, among the
partners, each is liable for the debts of the partnership in proportion to his or her
contribution of investment in the partnership or according to other provisions in the
partnership agreement.64 Because of the wide range of powers delegated to the
managing partner or partners, the non-executive partners have the right to monitor
the managing partner or partners.65 For instance, these partners may check the
accounting records of the partnership. Further, the managing partner or partners
have the duty to report to other non-executive partners concerning the financial
position of the partnership 7 The managing partner or partners may also be civilly
liable to the partnership if he or they deliberately or negligently exceed the authorized
scope of powers.6" The non-executive partners, however, cannot use internal
57. Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 2.
58. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 30.
59. Id. art. 31. •
60. Who is a responsible person is not defined in the Civil Law. Basically, the responsible person is the
partner who has been delegated with the power to manage the partnership business.
61. Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 25.
62. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 34.
63. Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 40, para. 2.
64. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 35.
65. Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 26, para. 2.
66. Id. art. 28, para.1.
67. id. art. 27.
68. Id. art. 35, para. 2.
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restrictions to defeat a claim by an innocent third party who was not aware of the
restrictions.69
Under the Civil Law, enterprise partnerships are specified in the legal person
chapter 0 instead of the natural person chapter. Article 52 of the Civil Law is the only
section pertaining to enterprise partnerships. Basically, if the enterprises, or an enter-
prise and an institution that engage in economic association, conduct joint operations
but do not have the qualifications of a legal person, each party to the association
shall, in proportion to its respective contribution of investment or according to the
agreement made, bear civil liability with the property each party owns or manages.
If joint liability is specified by law or by agreement, the parties shall assume joint
liability.7 ' It should be mentioned that article 52 does not formally use the phrase
"enterprise partnership." The main reason for this is that China did not have much
experience concerning horizontal or vertical economic cooperation at the time when
the Civil Law was enacted. When the effects or consequences of legal rules cannot
be fully predicted,72 detailed specifications of enterprise partnership law may not be
conducive to the development of these enterprises.
73
Partners may specify ways of withdrawal from a partnership.74 Even if there are
no provisions in the partnership agreement on the issue of withdrawal, it is still
permissible, in principle, for a partner to withdraw from the partnership. 5 Where
losses are caused to other partners by such a withdrawal, damages may be awarded,
taking into account the reasons of withdrawal and the degree of fault of the parties.76
For instance, a partner may be liable to the partnership if he informs other partners
of his decision to withdrawal without servicing reasonable notice.7 A partner may
also be liable to other partners if his withdrawal, which is not specified in law or in
contract, will adversely affect the partnership business. 8 An example is when the
withdrawal has resulted in the loss of an important contract. As for the debts of the
69. Id. art. 38.
70. The Chinese legal system is closer to the continental legal system in that the laws are codified. The civil
code is a very important code in these countries. Compared with these countries, China only codified some general
principles instead of detailed provisions of civil law. However, the basic structure in the General Principles of the
Civil Law is very similar to the Civil Codes in some continental countries such as Germany and France. In the Civil
Codes of these countries or in the General Principles of the Civil Law in China, there are two essential chapters.
One is on natural persons, and the other is on legal persons. One difference between natural persons and legal
persons is whether there is a separate entity. Legal persons are legal entities separate and different from the equity
investors. See generally Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (Code Civil) [BGB] sections 1-89 (Ian S. Forrester et. al. Trans
1975) (G.D.R.); see also generally Codice civile (Civil Code) [C.c.] Book One, Title one - two (Mario Beltramo
et. al. Trans. 1969) (Italy).
71. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 52.
72. Sometimes, empirical data are required to evaluate the effects or consequences of legal rules.
73. Ma Junju, Civil Law and the Status of Partnerships, 3 WUHAN UNIv. L. REv. 21, 22 (1986).
74. Opinions, supra note 55, art. 49.
75. Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 47.
76. Opinions, supra note 55, art. 49.
77. Partnership Law, supra note 56, arts. 46-48.
78. Id.
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partnership, the withdrawing party is liable if he or she has not paid his or her portion
as agreed in the partnership agreement. 9 But even though the withdrawing partner
has paid his or her agreed share, that person is still liable for the debts of the partner-
ship toward creditors so long as the partnership did not have sufficient assets to
satisfy all the creditors at the time of withdrawal' With respect to distribution of
assets of the partnership when the partnership ceases its business, the partnership
agreement shall be respected.8!' In a case where there is no ex ante or ex post
agreement on that issue, the view of the majority partners shall prevail if all partners
made an equal investment in the partnership or the view of the investor with the most
assets involved shall be respected if the partners' contributions differ. In the latter
case, the interest of other partners shall be taken into account.'a Obviously, the court
has the discretion in balancing the interest of the dominant partner and the interest
of other partners concerning the distribution of assets. Even after dissolution, the
former partners may still be jointly liable to creditors for the debts occurred during
the existence of the partnership. However, the creditors have to raise their claims
against the former partners within five years from the time of dissolution.8 3 Should
the creditors fail to file their claims as specified, the former partners shall no longer
be responsible for these debts. 84
Partnerships are widely used in the Chinese economy.85 Currently, a great num-
ber of law firms and accounting firms adopt the form of partnerships. In addition, a
large number of small businesses between friends or relatives prefer the structure of
partnership. This is probably because the partnership agreement and relevant laws
provide them with the necessary degree of control over their assets and management
decisions. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of enterprises have voluntarily chosen
to set up joint operations by utilizing the partnership form. Since 1980, horizontal
economic cooperation 86 has been encouraged by the Chinese Government.87 In 1980,
the State Council issued the Provisional Measures on the Encouragement of Eco-
79. Opinions, supra note 55, art. 50.
80. Id., see also Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 54.
81. Opinions, supra note 55, art. 52.
82. Id.
83. Partnership Law, supra note 56, art. 63.
84. Id.
85. Partnerships allow people to put small amounts of capital together, but these people do not lose control.
Decision making powers are determined by mutual agreement. Joint risk taking and sharing of residual to some
extent reduces divergence of interests between the partners. In contrast to the Company Law, the Law on
Partnerships does not require any minimum capital.
86. Economic cooperation means contractual relations including supply of raw materials and components,
distribution of products, joint production, and joint research. Horizontal economic integration refers to contractual
arrangements in similar industrial activities.
87. Horizontal economic cooperation enlarges contractual arrangements and facilitates the flow of infor-
mation. In the early 1980s, China was still informationally disadvantaged mainly because of isolation from the
world economy and rigid economic planning in the past.
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nomic Cooperation (Provisional Measures).88 Pursuant to the Provisional Measures,
economic cooperation shall not be affected by industries, locations, ownership, or
relevant authorities of the respective enterprises. In March 1986, the Provisional
Measures were replaced by another State Council document entitled Provisions on
Certain Issues Concerning Further Promotion of Horizontal Economic Co-
operations.89 The brief provision of article 52 of the Civil Law can be understood
from that background.
There are basically five reasons which may explain the necessity or popularity
of economic cooperation in the' 1980s and 1990s. In the first place, economic
cooperation facilitates efficient allocation of productive resources as better managers
possess wider control of various kinds of resources. For instance, the economic
cooperation between a good enterprise in a big city and an enterprise in a remote area
may improve the two. The remote enterprise now has better information and the good
enterprise may have access to cheap raw materials and labourers. Second, economic
cooperation produces the effect of synergy. In other words, economic cooperation
may create an amount of wealth which is far greater than the total amount of wealth
separately produced by all the individual enterprises. Third, economic cooperation
may reduce the impact of regionalism. In a transitional period from a planned eco-
nomy to a market economy, all the regions have a strong desire to develop. In an
economic sense, economic cooperation increases social wealth as it enlarges con-
tractual arrangements which provide a particular region with access to other products,
capital, human resources, technology and information markets which were not
available under the planned economy. Prosperity may also result in more revenues
for regional governments. Increasing revenue enlarges the power and visibility of
regional governments. Fourth, economic cooperation may help financially stable
enterprises voluntarily acquire some declining or insolvent enterprises. This is parti-
cularly beneficial when various levels of governments are facing the severe problem
of deficits and unemployment in state-owned enterprises. Finally, economic co-
operation reduces, to a large extent, uncertainties encountered by enterprises in a
transitional period from a planned economy to a market economy in which enter-
prises have to adapt to market means of sales and production as they now have to
market their products. Economic cooperation not only provides the necessary con-
nections but also facilitates information gathering. Resource allocation along the
vertical line through economic planning has to be replaced by resource allocation
along the horizontal line via contractual arrangements. Mainly because of these
reasons, economic cooperation is still very popular in the 1990's.
88. Provisional Measures on the Encouragement of Economic Cooperation, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 31 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1980).
89. Provisions on Certain Issues Concerning Further Promotion of Horizontal Economic Cooperations,
reprinted in THE LAWS OFTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 129 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil)
(1986).
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IV. COMPANMS
Limited liability companies and joint stock companies are creatures of the
Company Law" in China. These companies have separate legal entities in the sense
that shareholders are distinct from their companies. The liability of shareholders in
both types of companies is limited.9' Where a company is a limited liability com-
pany, each shareholder shall assume liability toward the company to the extent of the
amount of capital contributed by him, and the companies shall be liable for its debts
to the extent of all its assets. 2 The capital of a joint stock company is divided into
equal shares. Each shareholder in such a company assumes liability toward the com-
pany to the extent of the amount of shares held by him, but the company shall be
liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets.93
A. Formation of Companies
Generally speaking, the number of shareholders in a limited liability company
can be between tw6 and fifty. 4 There are, however, at least two exceptions. First, a
State-authorized institution or a department authorized by the state may establish a
wholly State-owned limited liability company, where the institution or department
is the only investor.95 Second, a foreign investor may set up a wholly-owned foreign
invested limited liability company pursuant to the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises. 96 Foreign-invested companies are sub-
ject to the Company Law. Where the laws on foreign invested enterprises, however,
provide otherwise, these latter laws97 shall prevail?8 The laws of business organi-
zations of foreign-invested enterprises are beyond the discussion of this article. In
contrast to a limited liability company, there are no restrictions on the number of
90. The Company Law, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPuBLIC OF CHINA 9 (The Legal Affairs
Bureau of the State Counsil) (1993) [hereinafter The Company Law].
91. Id. art. 3.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. art. 20.
95. Id.
96. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLUC OF CHINA 254 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1986).
97. These laws include the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, the Chinese-Foreign Contractual
Joint Venture Law and the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law.
98. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 18.
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shareholders in a joint stock company. The Company Law only mentions that there
must be more than five promoters99 in a joint stock company.' °
Unlike some common law jurisdictions, there is a requirement under the Com-
pany Law that a company shall have a minimum capital. The minimum registered
capital of a limited liability company varies in accordance with the nature of busi-
ness. The Company Law specifically provides that the minimum registered capital
of a limited liability company shall be: (i) Rmb 500,000 yuant°1 for a company
whose main business is related to production; (ii) Rmb 500,000 yuan for a company
whose main business is wholesale; (iii) Rmb 300,000 yuan for a company whose
main business is retail; and (iv) Rmb 100,000 yuan for a company whose main
business is the development of science and technology, consultancy or the provision
of services.t °2 For banking and insurance companies, the minimum registered capital
is much higher as specified in these relevant laws.103 Higher minimum registered
capital for joint stock companies is also required. Thus, the minimum amount of the
registered capital of ajoint stock company shall be Rmb 10 million yuan.1°4 The total
amount of a listed company's registered capital must amount to at least Rmb 50
million yuan.105
Chinese law not only imposes a minimum capital requirement but also requires
that the registered capital has been paid and certified by a statutory asset verification
institution before registration.'06 Given the irregular financial and economic activities
now in China, it is extremely difficult to catch those who do not have the necessary
amount of capital but bribe officials to obtain a business licence or those who borrow
money to incorporate companies and quickly withdraw their capital. To deter this
conduct, China has provided heavy administrative penalties and criminal sanctions.
For instance, where a company makes a false declaration about the amount of regis-
tered capital, it shall be subject to a fine of not less than Rmb 10,000 yuan and not
more than Rmb 100,000 yuan.'07 The individual applicant, or a responsible person
of a company, may be sentenced for a term of not more than three years for falsifying
the registered capital or not more than five years for falsifying the registered capital
99. Promoters are not defined in the Company Law. They refer to those who are responsible for the
establishment of a joint stock company. Unlike ordinary investors, promoters are required to hold a certain per-
centage of shares in a joint stock company. They shall be liable to other investors for the principle investment and
interest when the company fails to raise the required amount of capital. In addition, they are also liable to the
company if they are negligent in the establishment of the company.
100. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 75.
101. The equivalent in the US dollar is around $61,400.
102. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 23.
103. Minimum capital requirement is required for the benefit of creditors as thin capitalization may result
in excessive risk taking activities. Another reason for the set minimum amount is that the capital requirement must
be commensurate with the scale of operation.
104. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 78.
105. Id. art 152.
106. Id. arts. 23, 26, 78.
107. Id. art. 206.
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and withdrawing capital after incorporation.' °8 It is the author's view that the purpose
of the law will be achieved only after many years of consistent enforcement of these
penalties. The desired effect of protecting small creditors by imposing minimum
capital, however, has to be balanced by the high administrative costs of incorporation
and enforcement of these provisions. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that these
requirements encourage rent-seeking"t 9 activities in the sense that non-eligible appli-
cants may bribe registration officials. In addition, registration officials may also try
to extort money by delaying tactics or more stricter screening. Considering the
corruption problem in China, it is very costly to monitor the enforcement agents.
Another problem with the minimum capital requirement is its possible impact on
competition. Very high requirements of minimum capital may result in difficulties
for companies to enter into certain industries. Still another problem with minimum
capital requirement in China is the difficulty of raising capital by small companies
on the market. These small companies are already the victims of bank credit squeeze
in favour of large State-owned enterprises.
A company shall have a fixed site and the necessary conditions for production
and operation."I° Further, it shall have the articles of association of the company. The
articles of association include provisions mandated by the Company Law and pro-
visions voluntarily agreed upon by the shareholders. The Company Law mandates
certain provisions relating to the name and domicile of the company, the name of
shareholders or promoters, the rights and obligations of shareholders, the registered
capital, the method of contribution of capital, the governance of the company, the
conditions for transferring the shares of shareholders, the legal representative of the
company, the conditions for dissolution of the company and liquidation procedures,
and the scope of business of the company. The shareholders may adopt other pro-
visions suitable to their respective cases.
It is relatively clear that the ultra vires doctrine is not recognized in the eyes of
Chinese law. The Company Law dose not specify the liability of a company towards
third parties when the directors or officers act beyond the scope of the company's
registered business. It merely states that a company's business activities shall be
limited to its registered scope of business. Change of the registered scope of business
is possible so long as relevant legal procedures are followed and registration of such
amendments with the Company Registration Authority are filed."' Internally, the
108. The Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Sanctions of Criminal
Conduct in Contravention of the Company Law, art. 1-2, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 16,851 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1995).
109. Rent seeking activities cover a wide range of situations. For instance, governmental restrictions upon
economic activities may give rise to rents in many forms such as higher profits than the average on the market.
People then start to compete for these rents (higher rate of profit). Such competition may be illegal via the routes
of bribery and black markets. Rent seeking activities may cause tremendous efficiency losses. See generally
GORDON TLLOCK, RENT SEEKING 19-24 (Charles Rowley ed., 1993) (detailing rent seeking behaviours).
110. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 19, 73.
111. Id. art. 11.
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directors, supervisors and managers of a business shall be liable to compensate for
damages if, while performing their duties, they have violated the law, administrative
regulations or the articles of associations and have caused damage to the company."
2
Furthermore, the Regulations for the Administration of Company Registration1
3
provide administrative penalties for activities going beyond the registered scope of
business."4 The Civil Law, however, provides that an enterprise as legal person shall
bear liability for the directors' or managers' decisions which result in activities going
beyond the registered scope of business of the company." 5
It is much easier to establish a limited liability company than a joint stock
company. Except for engaging in trade such as production of food and drugs where
approval from relevant authorities is required, registration for a limited liability com-
pany will be obtained if the specified conditions in the Company Law are satisfied.
The establishment of any joint stock company requires the prior approval of the
departments authorized by the State Council or by the relevant provincial People's
Government." 6 The rationale for such approval is, it is often said, micro-control of
the capital flow in China and protection of the public.
A joint stock company may be established either through the method of pro-
motion or the method of public issue."7 The method of promotion means that, for the
purpose of establishing a company, all the shares to be issued by the company are
purchased by the promoters themselves. The method of public issue is different in
that the promoters purchase only a minimum portion of 35% of the shares to be
issued by the company while the remaining shares are offered to the general public
for subscription. ' 8
B. Governance Structure
The shareholder's meeting is the organ of authority for the company and through
the meeting the shareholders exercise their powers in accordance with the Company
Law and its articles." 9 The Company Law mandates that the following functions and
powers shall be exercised through the shareholders' meeting: to determine the busi-
ness policies and investment plans of the company, to elect and remove directors and
to determine compensation of directors, to appoint and dismiss supervisors of the
supervisory board (who shall have been elected from among the shareholders) and
to fix compensation for supervisors, to review and approve reports of the board of
112. Id. art. 63.
113. The Regulations for the Administration of Company Registration, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPuBLIC OFCHiNA 17, 313 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1994).
114. Id. art. 71.
115. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 49.
116. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 77.
117. Id. art. 74.
118. Id. arts. 74, 83.
119. Id. arts. 37, 102.
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directors and of the supervisory board or the supervisors, to review and approve the
annual financial budget and final accounts of the company. 2' The shareholders at the
shareholders meeting also have the power to review and approve plans for the distri-
bution of profits of the company and for the recovery of losses, to decide upon the
increase or reduction of the registered capital of the company, to decide upon the
issue of debentures by the company, to approve the transfer of capital from a share-
holder to a non-shareholder, to adopt resolutions on any merger, division, termination
and liquidation of the company, and to amend the articles of association of the
company.
12t
Pursuant to the Company Law, certain matters must receive two thirds of the
votes from shareholders.12 For limited liability companies, two thirds of all the
shareholders vote is required while only two thirds of the attending shareholders'
vote is needed for joint stock companies. Obviously, the transaction costs and hold-
out problems are recognized in these joint stock companies. The transaction costs in
a joint stock company are greater than in a limited liability company as the number
of shareholders in a joint stock company is much larger than the number of share-
holders in a limited liability company. The large size makes it difficult to organize
the shareholders and to negotiate business matters among themselves. The larger
number in a joint stock company also makes unanimous decisions more difficult.
Moreover, as the relationships between the shareholders in ajoint stock company are
not very close, they are more likely to disagree. Thus, resolutions on the merger,
division, dissolution, amendment of articles of association, and increase or reduction
of registered capital of a limited liability company shall be adopted by an affirmative
vote of the shareholders representing at least two-thirds of all the voting rights of a
limited liability company or two-thirds of the casted voting rights of a joint stock
company." There is no sound reason why the shareholders of limited liability com-
panies cannot decide that these matters may require unanimous resolutions or simple
majority t24 resolutions. To the extent where agreements can be reached at a low cost,
mandatory rules shall be avoided as far as possible. Self-interest dictates that share-
holders in these small companies are able to deal with these matters the best as these
decisions have wealth implications to themselves. They also have all the necessary
information for such decisions since shareholders in limited liability companies are
more likely to be actively involved in management. With respect to rules of pro-
cedure and voting procedure of a limited liability company, the shareholders may
120. Id. arts. 38, 103.
121. Id.
122. These matters include mergers, division, dissolutions, amendment of articles, and the increase or
reduction of registered capital.
123. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 39-40, 106-107.
124. Simple majority resolutions require that certain matters can be approved when more people vote for than
against the resolutions.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 10
decide whether simple majority, super majority" or unanimity of votes shall be re-
quired, according to the Company Law, in the articles of association of a company.12
Shareholders' meetings are divided into regular meetings and interim
meetings.27 Regular shareholders' meetings shall be convened as stipulated by the
articles of association. Provisions on shareholders' procedural rights of demanding
interim meetings differ between limited liability companies and joint stock com-
panies. For limited liability companies, interim shareholders' meetings may be
convened upon request by the shareholders representing one-fourth of the voting
rights, or by one-third of the board of directors, or by supervisors.'2 As for joint
stock companies, an interim shareholders' meeting shall be convened within two
months if a request is made by a shareholder or a group of shareholders holding more
than ten percent of the shares, or by the board of directors or by the supervisory
board. 29
Like many other countries, a shareholder's right to vote at the shareholders'
meeting shall be in proportion to the capital he has contributed or the shares he holds.
Each share entitles the shareholder to one vote. 3° Shareholders in joint stock
companies may appoint agents to attend the shareholders' meetings if they are not
able to attend the meetings.' 3'
Differences concerning notice of meetings to shareholders of limited liability
companies and shareholders of joint stock companies are obvious. Shareholders in
limited liability companies shall be notified of a shareholders' meeting at least fifteen
days prior to the scheduled date of the meeting. In contrast, shareholders in joint
stock companies shall be notified of the matters to be considered at a shareholders'
meeting at least thirty days before such a meeting is held. 33 The Company Law
further provides that no resolutions may be adopted in respect of matters not included
in the notice at interim shareholders' meetings. In other words, the notice must set
forth an agenda.T 4 In case of invalid notice, the shareholders concerned shall be
entitled to apply for an injunction in a People's Court to terminate the violation
before the meeting or sue for damages after the meeting.
35
A limited liability company shall have a board of directors, the number of which
shall comprise between three and thirteen.36 Given the large size, a joint stock
125. Super majority resolutions under the Company Law in China means that certain decisions require the
approval of more than two thirds of the shareholders.
126. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 39.
127. Id. arts. 43, 104.
128. Id. art. 43.
129. Id. art. 104.
130. Id. arts. 41, 106.
131. Id. art. 108.
132. Id. art. 44.
133. Id. art. 105.
134. Id.
135. Id. art. 111.
136. Id. art. 45.
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company shall have a board comprising between five and nineteen directors.'37 The
board of directors of a limited liability company established by state-owned
enterprises or state invested entities shall have employee representatives, who shall
be elected by the employees of the company through a democratic election.'
The board of directors shall be responsible to the shareholders' meeting139 to
exercise the following functions and powers: to convene shareholders' meetings and
to report its work at the shareholders' meeting, to implement the resolutions decided
at the shareholders' meeting, to decide the business plans and investment plans of the
company, and to formulate the annual financial budget and final accounts of the
company.Y° The board shall also have the power to formulate plans for the dis-
tribution of profits and the recovery of losses of the company, to formulate plans for
the increase or reduction of the registered capital, to propose plans for any merger,
division, dissolution and liquidation of the company, to decide upon the establish-
ment of the management organs of the company, to appoint and dismiss the general
manager (manager) of the company, and upon recommendation of the manager, to
appoint and dismiss the deputy manager(s) 4' and persons in charge of the financial
affairs of the company and to determine their remuneration, in addition to deter-
mining the basic management system of the company. 42
While the rules of procedure and voting procedures of the board of directors may
be specified in the articles of association by the shareholders of limited liability
companies, the Company Law stipulates clearly that a board meeting of a joint stock
company shall only be convened if more than half of all the directors are present.
4 3
Any resolution requires the affirmative vote of more than half of all the directors in
a joint stock company.'" Unlike the laws in other common law countries, where
directors may be removed at any time without cause provided compensation is paid,
the Company Law ensures that a director may not be removed from his office with-
out cause 45 prior to the expiration of his term of office.'6 This considerably reduces
the rights of shareholders. Chinese law in this respect is similar to the German Law
137. Id. art. 112.
138. Id. ar. 45.
139. Articles 37 and 102 of the Company Law provide a definition of a shareholders' meeting. Pursuant to
these two articles, a shareholders' meeting which is composed of all the shareholders is the organ of authority of
a company. According to this definition, the board of directors is really responsible to the shareholders as a
collective group. See The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 46, 112.
140. Id. arts. 46, 112.
141. The general manager and deputy managers are the executive officers of a company. They may or may
not be directors.
142. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 46, 112.
143. Id. art 117.
144. Id.
145. The Company Law does not specify the causes of dismissal as this is a matter of contract between a
company and its directors. Presumably, the employment contract between the company and the director spells out
these causes. Examples of these causes may include breach of duties on the part of a director when he engages in
self-dealing or competition with the company.
146. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 47, 115.
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instead of the Law of U.K. Under German law, directors can be removed only for
cause.147 In contrast, the law of U.K. does permit the removal of directors during
their term without cause provided compensation is paid. 48
Either a limited liability company or a joint stock company shall have one
general manager. Such a manager shall be responsible to the board of directors and
shall exercise the functions and powers to be responsible for the production,
operation and management of the company and for organizing implementation of the
resolutions of the board of directors, to organize the implementation of the annual
production, operation, and investment plans of the company, to draft plans for the
establishment of the internal management organs of the company. 49 The manager
shall also have the power to propose plans for the basic management system of the
company, to formulate detailed rules and regulations of the company, to recommend
the appointment and dismissal of the deputy manager(s) and of persons in charge of
the financial affairs of the company, to appoint and dismiss managerial personnel
(except those to be appointed and dismissed by the board of directors), and to
exercise other powers specified in the articles of association of the company or con-
ferred upon the general manager by the board of directors.5 °
Unlike company laws on the governance structure in common law jurisdictions,
the Company Law follows the German Law in that it requires a supervisory board'
be set up. Large-sized limited liability companies and joint stock companies shall
have a supervisory board which shall have more that three members. 52 Where a
limited liability company has a small number of shareholders and is small in size, it
may have one or two supervisors in lieu of a supervisory board. 5 3 In order to per-
form meaningfully the monitoring tasks, the Company Law provides that directors,
managers and responsible persons in charge of the financial affairs of the company
may not serve concurrently as supervisors."
The supervisory board shall be comprised of shareholder representatives and
employee representatives.55 A reasonable number of employee representatives shall
147. Theodor Baums, Comment, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks, 40 AM.J. CORP.
L. 503, 510 (1992).
148. See The UK Companies Act 1985, sec. 303(1); see also Southern Foundries Ltd. v. Shirlaw, 2 Eng. Rep.
445 (H.L. 1940).
149. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 50, 119.
150. Id.
151. The supervisory board is different from the board of directors in that the former is not involved in
formulating business plans or making business decisions. Basically, the supervisory board serves the purpose of
monitoring the directors or the senior managers. China follows the German model as the Chinese legal system is
closer to the continental legal system. Therefore, the law of the continental countries has a big impact upon China.
Another reason for adopting the supervisory board in China is the recognition that there are no identifiable share-
holders in China's state-owned enterprises. As such, another board with a small number of people is considered
necessary to monitor the directors and senior managers.
152. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 52, 124.
153. Id. art. 52.
154. Id. arts. 52, 124.
155. Id.
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be provided for by the articles of association of the company. The employee
representatives shall be elected by the employees through a democratic election.1
5 6
Generally, the supervisory board or the supervisors exercise the following
functions and powers: examining the financial affairs of the company, supervising
the work of the directors and the general manager and ascertaining if any violation
of the law, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company
has occurred during the performance of their duties. The supervisory board also has
the power to demand that directors and the managers rectify wrong doings which
have adversely affected the interests of the company, propose the holding of interim
shareholders' meetings, and exercise other functions and powers provided for in the
articles of association of the company.157
Upon examination the Company Law differs from the German law in at least two
important respects. In Germany, the exact proportion of employee representatives is
detailed.'58 In contrast, there is no strict requirement concerning the proportion of
employee representatives on the supervisory board. This may be dictated by the
conciliatory Chinese cultural values. Compromises are more likely occur in Chinese
society than in Western societies as emphasis on individual rights is not part of the
history or culture. The disadvantage of the German law is that standard requirements
may not be appropriate for all companies. There is no reason to believe that the state
is more capable of dealing with governance issues. The advantage of the German law
is the meaningful representation of employees. More members of employees on the
supervisory board make them more powerful when they bargain with the shareholder
representatives. The second difference is that, unlike German law, the supervisory
board under Chinese law has no right to determine the appointment and remuneration
of directors or the extension of their contracts.159 Thus, supervisory boards in China
are less powerful.
Directors, supervisors and managers have considerable power in managing the
affairs of a company. As they do not receive the full benefits of their major decisions,
they are likely to engage in some activities to maximize their self-interest. Such
activities may harm the company, or the shareholders whose interest aligns the best
with that of the company. To curtail these activities, the Company Law imposes strict
legal duties and sanctions on these players for breach of duties. Furthermore,
remedies are provided for in the Company Law. For instance, the directors, super-
visors and managers shall be liable to compensate for damages, if, while performing
their duties, they have violated the law, administrative regulations or the articles of
association and have caused damage to the company) 6°
156. Id.
157. Id. arts. 54, 126.
158. See Baums, supra note 147, at 505.
159. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 38, 103.
160. Id. art. 63.
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Directors, supervisors and managers of a company shall comply with the articles
of association of the company, perform their duties faithfully and uphold the interests
of the company and shall not use their position in the company to seek personal
gain.' They shall not, by using their position in the company, take bribes, accept
other unlawful income or misappropriate the property of the company. 62 Directors
and managers shall not misappropriate or lend funds of the company to a third party.
Nor shall they deposit the funds of the company in their personal accounts or the
accounts of other persons. Furthermore, they shall not use the property of the
company as collateral for the personal debts of the shareholders or for the debts of
other persons. 63
Competition and self-dealing with the company are strictly prohibited under the
Company Law. For instance, directors and managers shall not engage personally in,
or assist others in, the business operation of a company which carries out the same
business as the company in which he is serving a term. They also are prohibited from
engaging in activities which may adversely affect the interests of the company in
which they are serving. They must account to the company for the benefits derived
from the aforesaid business operation or activities."6 In addition, directors and
managers shall not enter into any contract or conduct any transaction with the com-
pany unless the articles of association provide otherwise or unless the consent from
shareholders on a meeting is obtained.'65 The law is not clear as to whether the
director or the manager, who is also a shareholder, may vote as a shareholder.
Consistent with past practice, the function of a trade union is recognized in the
Company Law. A company's employees shall, in accordance with the law, organize
a trade union to carry out activities and protect the lawful rights and interests of the
employees.'" Further, a company shall provide the trade union with facilities
necessary for the trade union to carry out its activities. 67 It has to be mentioned that
traditionally the trade unions did not have the right to demand wage increases as
these matters were dealt with through governmental administrative plans. Their roles
were limited to obtaining welfare benefits for the employees and recreational
activities. There is no systematic evidence that trade unions now play increasing roles
in demanding wage increases.
The Company Law requires the management to consult the trade union prior to
making decisions on certain matters involving the interests of its employees such as
their salaries, welfare, production safety, labour protection, and labour insurance. On
these matters, representatives of the trade union shall be invited to attend meetings
161. Id. art. 59.
162. Id.
163. Id. art. 60.
164. Id. art. 61.
165. Id.
166. Id. art. 16.
167. Id.
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such as board meetings, although these representatives shall not have the right to
vote.' " Furthermore, a company shall take into account the opinions and suggestions
of the trade union and the employees of the company when deciding important
matters of production and operation, and when formulating major rules and
regulations.1 69
The right of the trade union to participate and to be consulted concerning
governance matters has several virtues. In the first place, employees are not merely
being treated as means in the maximization of the wealth of a company. Quite the
contrary, they are always being treated as ends in the sense that their autonomy is
recognized. Second, such a recognition ensures a smooth transition from a planned
economy based on the public ownership of the productive resources to a market
economy where the productive resources may be owned both by the public and by
private individuals. At least in the past, employees' jobs were guaranteed under
planned economy. Consultation helps employees understand why they lose theirjobs
and need to seek employment elsewhere themselves. Otherwise, employees in state-
owned enterprises may be quickly demoralized during the transition period to a
market-oriented economy. Third, recognizing the interest of the stakeholder of
employees in the governance structure to a limited extent may protect those who may
not be able to protect themselves through a contract either for the reasons of infor-
mation asymmetry or for the collective action problem on the part of employees. 70
Employees are not sophisticated bargainers as they may not be able to predict the
future prospect of a company. Further, they may not be able to organize themselves
efficiently due to the large number of people involved. Some of the employees may
simply free ride on other people's efforts.
It has now been generally recognized in China that it is relatively easy to
promulgate some laws and regulations but it is quite a different matter to make these
laws operate in reality. Whereas various private companies may easily apply this
Company Law to their companies, state-owned enterprises still have difficulty
applying this Law. For instance, which particular body shall exercise the share-
holders' rights of the State-owned enterprise specified in the Company Law? As the
existing State-owned enterprises used to be invested by different bodies in the State
hierarchy, it is difficult to determine which body shall be responsible for the shares
owned by the State in a particular company. Furthermore, the Company Law only
specifies the rights and duties of the shareholders meeting, the board of directors, and
the supervisory board. It is still far away from solving agency costs' problems in
168. Id. art. 55.
169. Id. art. 56.
170. For examples of collective action problems, see MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DEcLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGiDrTy 17-35, 243-6 (1982).
171. Agency costs refer to the conflict of interests between shareholders and the management of a company.
Even if directors, supervisors and senior managers are rational, they may not necessarily always work for the best
interest of the shareholders. Agency costs include monitoring costs incurred by the shareholders to watch the
management and the residual loss which can not be avoided through monitoring. Agency costs arise whenever there
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China's State-owned enterprises. For instance, who are monitoring the directors,
supervisors, and senior managers. Do the people in the State institution or department
have the sufficient incentives and the knowledge to check the performance of these
directors, supervisors, and senior managers?
C. Mergers and Divisions
Any merger or division of a company shall be decided by the shareholders on
172meetings. For a joint stock company, decisions of any merger and division shall
be approved by the authorized departments of the State Council or by the relevant
provincial People's Government. 73
There are basically two routes to carry out a merger plan. Thus, a merger may
take the form of merger by absorption or merger by new establishment. '74The former
means that one company takes over another and the party that is taken over dissolves.
The latter involves two or more companies merging together to establish a new
company with the parties to the merger dissolving.' 75
In case of a merger or division, creditors are entitled to require the company to
satisfy their debts or to provide a guarantee for their debts within a certain period. No
merger or division shall be allowed to proceed if the company fails to satisfy its debts
or to provide the guarantee. 76 The claims and debts of the creditors of these com-
panies to a merger shall be succeeded by the acquiring company or the newly
established company as a result of the merger.'17 As for a division of a company, the
debts of any original company shall be assumed by the companies resulted from the
division in accordance with the division agreement.1
7 1
When mergers or divisions are implemented, registration or amendment of the
original registration is required. If a company is dissolved, it shall apply for
cancellation of its registration in accordance with the law. 79
D. Insolvency, Dissolution and Liquidation
A company may be dissolved if certain events specified by law or the articles of
association of the company occur. Specifically, a company may be dissolved if the
terms of business operation contained in the articles of association of the company
exists delegation from the shareholders to the management and when shareholders do not have the necessary infor-
mation to evaluate the behaviours of the management.
172. The Company Law, supra note 90, art. 182.
173. Id. art. 183.
174. Id. art. 184.
175. Id.
176. Id. arts. 184, 185.
177. Id. art. 184.
178. Id. art. 185.
179. Id. art. 188.
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expire or an event stipulated in the articles of association takes place."' 0 In addition,
dissolution may also be demanded by shareholders on a shareholders' meeting.8
Furthermore, a merger or division may also lead to the dissolution of a company."8 2
Dissolution resulting from the operation of law occurs if a company violates the
law or administrative regulations." 3 In addition, the insolvency of a company will
cause the dissolution of a company by the operation of the law."s4 Currently, the Law
on Enterprise Bankruptcy 85 (Bankruptcy Law) applies only to state-owned enter-
prises. It is expected that a bankruptcy law applicable to all types of enterprises will
be enacted soon. Before that, however, enterprises, other than those state-owned, are
subject to the relevant provisions, regarding insolvency or dissolution, of the
Company Law, the Civil Procedure Law, and the Civil Law on the national level.
Generally speaking, legal provisions in these laws are very brief and vague. For
instance, there are only a few provisions in the Company Law on liquidation.
Similarly, there are only nine provisions related to insolvency in the Civil Procedural
Law. Nowhere in the Civil Procedure Law does it mention whether secured creditors
are bound by a reorganization plan. The Civil Law only contains a few provisions
related to the rights of creditors. There are no procedural and substantive provisions
in the Civil Law concerning the exercise of the rights of creditors as a collective
group.
When a company is dissolved, a liquidation committee is established. 8 6 Where
a company is dissolved in accordance with provisions in the articles of association,
a liquidation committee shall be established within fifteen days thereafter.'87 A
liquidation committee of a limited company is composed of the shareholders.
Membership of a liquidation committee of a joint stock company shall be decided
upon at the shareholders' meeting. If a company is dissolved as a result of the
violation of laws and administrative regulations, the department in charge shall
organize the shareholders, relevant departments and relevant professionals to form
a liquidation committee for liquidation. 8 The application of this provision may
cause some administrative problems. For state-owned enterprises, it is relatively easy
to identify the department in charge. Therefore, it is easy and quick to establish a
liquidation committee. However, it may be difficult to find out which department is
in charge of a non state-owned enterprise in some cases. For instance, it may not be
easy for a private enterprise or a foreign invested enterprise to locate the department
180. Id. art. 190.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. art. 192.
184. Id. art. 189.
185. The Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 289
(The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Council) (1986).
186. The Company Law, supra note 90, arts. 189, 191-92.
187. Id. art. 191.
188. Id. art. 192.
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in charge. Is it arranged along the lines of products or regions? If the department in
charge cannot be easily identified, the establishment of a liquidation committee may
be delayed. This provision seems to be drafted by those who are accustomed to the
planning model.
Where a company is lawfully declared insolvent for having been unable to satisfy
its debts, the People's Court concerned shall, in compliance with relevant laws,
organize the shareholders, persons from the relevant departments and relevant pro-
fessionals to form a liquidation committee for the liquidation of the assets of the
company. 9
In the liquidation process, the liquidation committee of a particular company
shall exercise the following functions and powers:' 90 ascertaining the assets of the
company by preparing a balance sheet and a detailed inventory of assets, serving
notice upon the creditors or make a public announcement, completing the company's
unfinished business in relation to the liquidation, preparing a list of the claims and
debts of the company, paying taxes owned by the company, disposing, after repay-
ment of the debts of the company, the remaining assets, and taking actions or
defending in civil proceedings on behalf of the company.
Once a liquidation committee is set up, the committee shall inform the creditors
of the company of its establishment within ten days following the date of its estab-
lishment, and make a public announcement in a newspaper at least three times,
within sixty days following the aforesaid date.'9' The creditors shall submit their
claims to the committee within thirty days after the date on which they received
notice, or, where notice has not been received, within ninety days after the date of the
making of the first public announcement.'9 In the claim, a creditor shall specify the
relevant items of the claims and produce documentary evidence such as a contract
to support his claim. If it is satisfied, the liquidation committee shall register the
claims.' 93
When liquidation proceedings are concluded, the liquidation committee prepares
a liquidation report and submits the same at the shareholders' meeting, or to the
department in charge, for endorsement."9 The company shall also request the
Company Registration Authority to cancel the registration of the company and make
a public announcement of the termination of the company.'95
189. Id. art. 189.
190. Id. art. 193.
191. Id. art. 194.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. art. 197.
195. Id.
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V. OTHER FoRMs OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
In addition to sole proprietorships, partnerships and companies, there are still
other special business organizations. Equity and contractual joint ventures which are
not discussed in this article are two such examples. Other economic associations
mentioned in article 53 of the Civil Law are mainly based on contracts. These
economic associations are only based upon contractual relations related to production
or marketing as no new entities are created. This article, however, is not intended to
examine these organizations. Instead, it will focus on two particular forms of busi-
ness organizations. They are the state-owned enterprises and the collectively-owned
enterprises. These forms of business organizations used to dominate the Chinese
economy and still play a significant role. At present, there exist several pieces of
legislation governing each category. The relevant laws and regulations will be briefly
examined.
A. State-Owned Enterprises (Enterprises owned by the whole people)
The laws relating to enterprises owned by the whole people (state-owned
enterprises) were enacted in 1988 and 1992 and were intended to enhance the
efficiency of these enterprises as will be discussed immediately. Under the planning
model, state-owned enterprises were instrumental in carrying out the State's eco-
nomic plan. They have neither independent legal status nor autonomy. The evolution
of the laws on state-owned enterprises can only be understood by China's continuing
economic reform policies discussed in the introduction section of this article. The
policy goal is to change the rigid planned economy to a market economy with some
minor governmental intervention. While this macro-economic reform is intended to
solve the information and coordination problem of the planning system, the micro-
economic reform is to solve the structural problems of the state-owned enterprises.
The Government wants to make it clear that the State will not bear unlimited
liability for the debts of these enterprises. In these state-owned enterprises there
exists complete separation between ownership and management. Thus, the Civil Law
provides that state-owned enterprises may obtain the status of legal persons when
they have sufficient funds as stipulated by the state, have articles of association,
organizations and premises, have the ability to independently bear civil liability and
have been approved and registered by the competent authority.' 96 Like other legal
persons, such as companies, a state-owned enterprise shall bear civil liability with the
property that the State authorizes it to manage. 97 This legal issue became clearer
when China adopted the Bankruptcy Law. This Bankruptcy Law only applies to
state-owned enterprises. While this law has been in existence for many years, it is not
196. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 41.
197. Id. art. 48.
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always strictly enforced. Several economic and non-economic reasons are relevant
to explain the difficulty of enforcing the Bankruptcy Law.
To the Central government, exit of inefficiency enterprises is not a purely
economic problem.198 On the political side, large scale bankruptcies would affect
political stability. Allowing a large scale of bankruptcies also contradicts the notion
of socialist economic system, a concept inserted in the Constitution of China.19
Article 7 of the Constitution states that the state-owned economy, i.e., the sector of
the socialist economy under the ownership of the whole people, is the leading force
in the national economy. The State ensures the consolidation and growth of the State-
owned economy. To the senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, con-
siderable decrease of the state-owned sectors undermines the political base of the
Party's leadership. On economic grounds, forcing money losing enterprises to go
bankrupt is not the equivalent to efficient resource allocation. The distorted prices on
the market caused by differences between market allocation and State allocation of
certain raw materials such as oil, coal and iron ore may imply that some efficient
enterprises lose money. In addition, mutual defaulting between enterprises further
complicates the issue. Efficient enterprises may have cash flow problems because
they have difficult collecting accounts receivable. Under these conditions, applying
the liquidity test of bankruptcy is not necessarily a measure of efficiency.
To local governments, a large number of bankruptcies affect their image of
political achievements. Many unsuccessful projects were the result of lobbying
efforts by local governments. Bankruptcy of these enterprises is an indication that
their past promises have not been honored and that the investment decisions were
wrong. Furthermore, local governments can still claim credit from maintaining these
enterprises. For instance, inefficient enterprises still add to the output statistics.
Moreover, money losing enterprises still pay certain kinds of taxes, especially turn-
over taxes. Although these taxes may flow back to these inefficient enterprises in the
form of subsidies, local governments can still claim the increased tax from their
localities.200 Finally, inefficient enterprises can still provide benefits to local
officials.2°' These officials can obtain reimbursement from the inefficient enterprises
for their "entertainment" bills.2 2
As for local banks, State-owned enterprises are their main debtors. At present,
90 percent of the working capital of most State-owned enterprises comes from bank
loans.203 Among these, a very high percentage of loans is non-performing loans. To
198. Wong Wuyi, An Analysis of the Factors Affecting Bankruptcy of State-owhed Enterprises, 6 ECON. RES.
J. 41, 42 (1994).
199. See X[ANFA, supra note 19.
200. See Wuyi, supra note 198, at 41.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Explanations Concerning the Law on Commercial Banks of the People's Republic of China, May 10,
1995, Thirteenth Session of the Eighth Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (speech delivered
by Zhou Zhengqing).
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these banks, non-performing loans are still on their record of loans. Canceling non-
performing loans, however, decreases the total loans, affecting their performance in
the eyes of higher authorities.
Bankruptcy is also bad in the eyes of State-owned enterprises. Employees do not
expect their enterprises to go bankrupt. They even do not believe their State-owned
enterprises would go bankrupt. To them, unpaid wages and non-reimbursed medical
bills would be paid by their enterprises sooner or later.2 4 To senior managers,
bankruptcy means failure of their management and the end of their jobs in a market
economy. They may also discover that it is not easy for them to find good jobs
elsewhere in a market oriented economy. All these factors explain why the number
of bankruptcy cases dealt with by the courts is extremely low. From the date when
the Bankruptcy Law became effective on November 1, 1988, to the end of 1993, the
courts in China only adjudicated 1417 bankruptcy cases. 5 This is quite inconsistent
with the fact that more than 35 percent of the State-owned enterprises are losing
money.
If the Civil Law permits State-owned enterprises to obtain the status of legal
persons, the Regulations for Converting the Status of the Enterprises Owned by the
Whole People (CSER) mandates that an enterprise owned by the whole people shall
obtain the status of a legal person.2 The CSER is enacted pursuant to the Law on
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (IEOWP). According to the
IEOWP, a State-owned enterprise shall be a socialist commodity production and
operation unit which shall, in accordance with law, make its own managerial
decisions, take full responsibility for its profits and losses and practice independent
accounting. 2 7 While the property of the enterprise is owned by the whole people, the
enterprise enjoys the right to possess, utilize and dispose of, according to law, the
property which the State has authorized it to operate and manage." 8 A fundamental
structural problem clearly exists in the complete separation between ownership and
management. As symbolic shareholders, the whole people simply will not be
interested in monitoring the activities and management of these State-owned enter-
prises as the costs always exceeds the benefits to any particular shareholder.
In order to ensure that State-owned enterprises have the autonomy of managing
their business, the IEOWP spells out some important rights of these enterprises.
Specifically, a state-owned enterprise shall have the right to arrange, on its own, the
production of products needed for society or the provision of services for society,20
9
204. Wuyi, supra note 198, at 42.
205. Id. at 41.
206. The Regulations for Converting the Status of Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 633 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1992) [hereinafter
CSER]; see id art. 2. (noting that the Regulations for Converting the Status of Enterprises Owned by the People was
intended to push the state owned enterprises onto the market).
207. IEOWP, supra note 12, art. 2.
208. Id.
209. Id. art. 23.
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to choose the suppliers for itself and purchase from them materials needed for
production,210 to negotiate and sign contracts with foreign parties, to budget and use
its retained funds subject to state regulations,211 to determine such forms of wages
and methods of bonus distribution as appropriate to its specific conditions92 2 to
employ or dismiss its staff members and workers subject to labour regulations,213 to
engage in joint operations with other enterprises or institutions or to invest or hold
shares in other enterprises,2 4 and to issue bonds subject to the approval of the State
Council.15
Furthermore, state-owned enterprises shall have the right to reject the exaction
of its manpower, materials and financial resources in the form of apportionment by
any state organ or unit.2 16 Exaction by apportionment is defined as any demand on
the enterprise by any State organ or unit in any form for the provision of manpower,
materials and financial resources except as otherwise stipulated by the laws and
regulations.
217
It is important to note there are still many constraints on these state-owned
enterprises. For instance, the enterprise must fulfill any mandatory plans. 8 As the
state may change the prices of certain products or raw materials, the enterprise is
provided a limited right of requesting an adjustment of these mandatory plans. It is,
however, relatively clear that the enterprise has the right to reject production assign-
ments given by any department or unit outside the mandatory plans. 219 Furthermore,
such an enterprise undertaking production according to a mandatory plan shall have
the right to market for itself products manufactured in excess of the planned quota.22
The above several provisions breed a market distortion in that the price of
products or resources allocated through the mandatory plan differ from that of those
allocated on the market. Generally speaking, the prices of materials allocated within
the mandatory plan are lower than those on the open market. This artificial restriction
or distortion may result in rent seeking"1 activities as more enterprises have the
desire to obtain more resources within the planning system while selling more pro-
ducts on the open market. Fortunately, the economic reform has significantly reduced
the portion of products allocated through mandatory plans.
210. Id. art. 25.
211. Id. art. 28.
212. Id. art. 30.
213. Id. art. 31.
214. Id. art. 34.
215. Id.
216. Id. art. 33.
217. Id.
218. Id. art. 35. Mandatory plans require that a State-owned enterprise produce certain quantities of iron,
steel, or oil.
219. Id. art. 23.
220. Id. art. 24.
221. See supra note 109 (regarding rent seeking activities).
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The Regulations for Converting the Status of the Enterprises Owned by the
Whole People (CSER) 2 was intended to push the state-owned enterprises onto the
market. The CSER makes the rights contained in the IEOWP more specific and
concrete.
A state-owned enterprise shall have a factory director,'m who shall be the legal
representative of the enterprise. The enterprise is responsible for the business con-
ducts undertaken by the legal representative and other persons on behalf of the enter-
prise.224 Liability is limited to the assets managed by the enterprise in accordance
with the authorization of the State.'
The factory director shall be appointed by the competent department of the
government or elected by the staff and workers' congress of the enterprise.2 26 The
factory director shall exercise leadership relating to production, operation and
management of the enterprise.2 7 Specifically, the factory director shall exercise the
powers and functions of deciding on the various plans of the enterprise or report
them for examination and approval in accordance with law and the provisions of the
State Council, deciding on the administrative setup of the enterprise, proposing to the
competent department of the government the appointment or removal, employment
or dismissal of leading administrative cadres at the level of a deputy-director 228 of the
factory, appointing or removing, employing or dismissing the intermediate-level
leading administrative cadres of the enterprise, proposing plans for wage adjustment
and bonus distribution, designing important rules and regulations, and referring them
to the staff and workers' congress for examination and approval, proposing pro-
grammes for the use of welfare funds and making suggestions regarding such other
matters as are important for the well-being and benefits of the staff and referring
them to the staff and workers congress according to law, and submitting to the
competent department of the government proposals for rewarding or punishing
leading administrative cadres at the level of a deputy-director of the factory?
2 9
As the factory director and other officials of the company are agents of the enter-
prise, monitoring their activities is essential in ensuring that these agents work for the
best interest of the enterprise instead of themselves. The governmental agency in
charge of the enterprise have the powers to check the financial position of the enter-
prise through an audit,20 to determine the ratios, methods or quotas of profit dis-
tribution between the State and the enterprise in accordance with the regulations of
222. See CSER, supra note 206.
223. IEOWP, supra note 12, art. 44.
224. CSER, supra note 206, art. 23.
225. Id.
226. IEOWP, supra note 12, art. 44.
227. Id. art. 45.
228. The deputy director is to assist the director under normal circumstances. However, when the directors
is away or ill and is not able to manage the factory, then the deputy director performs the job of the director.
229. IEOWP, supra note 12, art. 45.
230. CSER, supra note 206, art. 42.
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the State Council, to decide and approve productive construction projects, to decide
or approve the methods of management and establishment, division, merger
(excluding takeovers), termination, auction, takeovers and bankruptcy, to decide or
approve the appointment, removal, and the rewarding and punishment of the factory
director, to provide regulations concerning asset management and monitoring, and
to approve the reporting of bad debts, offset, and management of vital assets of the
enterprise.
A state-owned enterprise may be terminated for the reasons of being canceled
due to its violation of laws and regulations, being dissolved by decision of the
competent department of the government made in accordance with the provisions of
the laws and regulations, being declared bankrupt in accordance with law, or other
matters. 2 t
B. Collectively-Owned Enterprises
Collectively-owned enterprises in rural areas and in towns or in cities are
respectively governed by the Regulations on Rural Collectively-owned Enterprises
(Rural Enterprise Regulations) 232 and the Regulations on Urban Collectively-owned
Enterprises (Urban Enterprise Regulations). Both urban collectively-owned enter-
prises and rural collectively-owned enterprises are part of the state economy.
The Rural Enterprise Regulations do not define the term "rural collectively-
owned enterprise." The Regulations specifically mention, however, that they do not
apply to agricultural producers' cooperatives,' 5 agricultural supply and marketing
cooperatives236 and agricultural credit cooperatives.237 In contrast, the Urban Enter-
231. IEOWP, supra note 12, art. 19.
232. The Regulations on Rural Collectively-owned Enterprises, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPuBLIC OF CHINA 437 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Council) (1990) [hereinafter Rural Enterprise
Regulations].
233. The Regulations on Urban Collectively-owned Enterprises, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 593 (The Legal Affairs Bureau of the State Counsil) (1991) [hereinafter Urban Enterprise
Regulations].
234. Id. art. 3; see also Rural Enterprise Regulations, supra note 232, art. 3.
235. Agricultural producers' cooperatives began to appear in the 1950s under the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party. The purpose of these cooperatives is mainly to provide mutual assistance in farming. Agricultural
producers' cooperatives are rare now although there are still some in remote or very backward rural area. See A
DICTIONARYOF CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NEW TERMS 656 (1994) (providing an incomplete definition of this basic
historical fact).
236. Agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives were established in rural areas or small towns in the
1950s. The farmers or residents or local governments in small towns contributed capital to these cooperatives. The
business of these cooperatives is normally limited to selling farming tools, seeds and fertilizers to farmers and pur-
chasing some agricultural goods and then selling them elsewhere. These cooperatives are still quite common in
China. See id. at 319 (presenting an incomplete definition of this basic historical fact).
237. Rural Enterprise Regulations, supra note 232, art. 2. Agricultural credit cooperatives were established
collectively by farmers with the assistance of State-owned banks in the 1950s. Originally, the business of these
cooperatives was to accept small deposits and lend money at very low rates of interest mainly to farmers. They are
still very popular in China but now are also providing loans to non-agricultural projects.
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prise Regulations provide a definition and some criteria. 8 An urban collectively-
owned enterprise is collectively-owned by the people of the enterprise. The owners
make joint contributions and remuneration is mainly based on the contribution of
labour of each individual person. 9 Such an enterprise may be a single entity or a
combination of several entities. Generally, the proportion of assets collectively-
owned should be more that 51 percent.2m The State also invested money in some
urban collective enterprises in the past. Thus, if the proportion of investment by the
State is higher than 50 percent in an urban collective enterprise, the nature of the
enterprise is entirely different. Both urban and rural collectively-owned enterprises
may obtain the status of legal persons as specified in the Civil Law?4' As legal
persons, the owners will not be liable for the debts of the enterprises. 42
1. Establishment, change of registered matters and termination
An enterprise should have a name, proper organizations and articles of as-
sociations, have business premises and facilities which should comply with sanitary
and safety conditions, have the necessary fund and staff corresponding to the scale
of business operation or services, and have a clearly specified business scope.243
If the conditions of establishment are met, the enterprise shall obtain the approval
from the competent authority in charge of either rural or urban collectively-owned
enterprises. Furthermore, the enterprise has to be registered with the local SAIC and
receive a business licence or an enterprise legal person business license, depending
on whether the enterprise is a legal person or not. If the enterprise is not a legal
person, the staff may be personally liable for the debts of the enterprise.
In case of any merger, division, cession of business, relocation, name change, or
change of other registered items, the enterprise has to obtain approval from the SAIC
to vary the original registration.' The enterprise is terminated if it is unable to
continue its business, if it violates laws and regulations and if it goes insolvent or if
it is merged or divided.245
238. Urban Enterprise Regulations, supra note 233, art. 4.
239. Id
240. Id.
241. Civil Law, supra note 5, art. 41.
242. Id art. 48; see also Urban Enterprise Regulations, supra note 233, art. 6; Rural Enterprise Regulations,
supra note 232, art. 17.
243. Urban Enterprise Regulations, supra note 233, art. 12; see also Rural Enterprise Regulations, supra
note 232, art. 13.
244. Rural Enterprise Regulations, supra note 232, art. 15; see also Urban Enterprise Regulations, supra
note 233, art. 15.
245. Urban Enterprise Regulations, supra note 233, arts. 15, 17; see also Rural Enterprise Regulations,
supra note 232, art. 15.
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2. Governance structure
The governance structure of collectively-owned enterprises is quite different
from that of state-owned enterprises. Farmers' meetings or farmer representatives'
meetings6 exercise the ownership right 4 The nature of business, methods of
operation, and appointment and methods of selection of factory directors or
managers, shall be determined by the owners or their representatives at these
meetings.' s In addition, distribution of after-tax profits, matters concerning mergers,
divisions, relocations, petition of bankruptcy, termination of business of the enter-
prise, shall be resolved at these farmers meetings or farmer representatives meetings.
The power of running the day to day business is delegated to the factory director or
manager.249 Similarly, urban collectively-owned enterprises establish a system of
staff meetings if the number of staff of the enterprise is below one hundred or staff
representative meetings if the number of staff exceeds three hundred. ' If the number
of staff of an enterprise is between one hundred and three hundred, the staff may
adopt either the staff meeting or the staff representatives meeting. At these meetings,
the staff or representatives of the staff exercise the powers to propose or amend the
articles of association, to elect, remove, appoint or dismiss factory directors,
manager, deputy factory directors or deputy managers, and to review various pro-
posals submitted by the factory director or manager. In addition, the staff as staff
representatives are able to resolve significant matters of staff remuneration, wage
adjustment policies, distribution of bonus and dividends, matters of staff welfare, and
to decide upon the methods of punishment or rewards of staff and other regu-
lations."1 Other daily business matters are also assigned to the factory director or
manager.252
V. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has examined the laws governing business organizations in China
in a descriptive way. Mention should be made that these laws in China are
historically arranged in accordance with ownership of the productive resources. As
discussed in the introduction section of this article, State-owned enterprises and
collectively-owned enterprises used to dominate the Chinese economy. Economic
reform started from 1978 has greatly changed the nature of the economy. The
246. Farmers' meetings are the organs where the farmer investors exercise their powers concerning important
business matters of a rural collective enterprise. When the number of farmer investors of a rural collective enterprise
is very large, representatives of the farmer investors exercise powers at farmer representatives' meetings. Id.
247. Rural Enterprise Regulations, supra note 232, art. 18.
248. Id. art. 19.
249. Id. arts. 19,22.
250. Urban Enterprise Regulations, supra note 233, art. 27.
251. Id. art. 28.
252. Id. art. 34.
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allocation of resources through economic planning has been replaced by the
allocation of resources through voluntary, contractual means by various market parti-
cipants. Change or amendment of laws of business organizations need to be
understood from its evolution in response to economic reform in China. The legal
framework of business organizations law has not reached a level of maturity. The
current enforcement agencies are still not quite adequate in making the laws credible.
Significant progress, however, has been made. If the Chinese government is able to
overcome ideological barriers, the next ten years will witness not only further
development of China's business laws but also a continuing high rate of economic
development with improving efficiency.
